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Abstract 
My first goal is to motivate a distinctively metaphysical approach to the problem 
of induction. I argue that there is a precise sense in which the only way that 
orthodox Humean and non-Humean views can justify induction is by appealing to 
extremely strong and unmotivated probabilistic biases. My second goal is to sketch 
what such a metaphysical approach could possibly look like. After sketching such 
an approach, I consider a toy case that illustrates the way in which such a 
metaphysics can help us make progress on the problem of induction.  
 
1. Introduction 
Every time we eat bread, it nourishes. Every time we drop an apple, it falls at 9.8 m/s2. Those who 
haven’t felt the force of skeptical arguments might find these facts to be fairly mundane. However, 
for those who have experienced the inductive vertigo that Hume famously did, these facts are 
shocking. After all, we can certainly imagine that the next time we eat bread, it might poison us. 
The next time we drop an apple, it could very well fall up at 9.8 m/s2. There are an infinity of ways 
in which the world could go completely haywire in the next second: gravity might reverse, tigers 
might start popping into existence, or the whole planet might disappear in a puff of smoke. What 
reason do we have for thinking that the world won’t go haywire in the next second? The problem 
of induction, at least on one formulation, is the problem of giving some sort of story as to why 
we’re justified in thinking that the world will continue to go on as we expect it to. 
I have two main goals in this paper. My first goal is to formulate a mathematically precise, 
probabilistic version of the problem of induction (§§2-4). My formulation will take the form of an 
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inconsistent triad: a set of three premises, each of which seems very plausible, that together imply 
a contradiction. This more precise version of the problem of induction has two main virtues. First, 
it gives a certain sense of urgency to the problem of induction. As we will see, the only way to 
recover anything like our inductive practices is either to swallow some extremely strong and 
seemingly unmotivated probabilistic assumptions or to pursue an ambitious rationalistic 
metaphysical project, akin to the kind of project that Descartes carried out in his Meditations to 
ward off his own skeptical doubts. Second, the inconsistent triad provides a taxonomy of ways one 
might respond to the problem of induction. The three main ways philosophers have tried to respond 
to the problem of induction nicely correspond to the three different premises one might deny in 
the inconsistent triad.  
My second goal is to make some initial progress towards providing a distinctively metaphysical 
solution to the problem of induction (§§5-9). Although my remarks won’t amount to anything like 
a complete solution to the problem, I conclude by illustrating how it might work in a very simple, 
toy case. 
 
2. The Informal Problem of Induction 
We can break up the inductive skeptic’s argument into two parts. First, there is the claim that there 
are an infinity of possible ways that the future might deviate in strange ways from the past. Apples 
might suddenly start rising, and bread might suddenly start poisoning. Second, there is the claim 
that we have no good reason for thinking that the actual world won’t deviate from the past in one 
of these strange ways. The skeptic might try to justify this point in different ways. For example, 
the skeptic might claim that there is nothing we could say to convince the counter-inductivist, 
someone who makes the ‘opposite’ inferences about the future than the inductivist. After all, the 
standard circular justification in favor of induction (‘induction has always worked before!’) can 
also be given by the counter-inductivist (‘since counter-induction has horribly failed in the past, it 
will surely work next time!’). Ultimately, the skeptic says that our inductive inferences are simply 
based on the assumption, the faith, that the world is simple or law-like or uniform. Given that we 
don’t have any good reason to make these arbitrary assumptions, the skeptic says that we should 
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revise our beliefs about the future. For example, we should abandon our belief that the sun will 
rise tomorrow. 
The first step of the skeptic’s argument is crucial. As a parody argument, suppose a mathematical 
skeptic argued as follows: 
You should abandon your belief that 2+2 =4. After all, there are an uncountable infinity of 
possibilities in which 2+2 isn’t 4. For example, for every real number r, there is a possibility 
in which 2+2 = r. Given all of these possibilities, what reason could we have for thinking 
that we aren’t in one of the worlds where 2+2 isn’t 4? The assumption that we are in such 
a world is simply an arbitrary bias in favor of the number 4. 
This skeptical argument isn’t going to be keeping anybody up at night. We should of course simply 
deny that there are any possibilities where 2+2 isn’t 4. The reason why inductive skepticism is so 
much more gripping is because it does seem like a genuine metaphysical possibility that the world 
could go completely haywire tomorrow. If these sorts of worlds are genuinely possible, then it 
seems like we need some reason to think that the actual world isn’t one of these possible worlds. 
Still, even though the problem of inductive skepticism is more compelling, the vast majority of 
philosophers have not become converted skeptics.1 In part, this is because it is unclear what 
positive argument there is to think that induction is irrational. The skeptic simply challenges us to 
provide a justification of induction that would convince the skeptic or other fanciful characters like 
the counter-inductivist. But why think that we must be able to convince the skeptic in order for 
induction to be rational? We might not be able to convince the flat-earther that the earth is round. 
Should we therefore abandon our belief that the earth is round? Roger White (2015) has coined 
the phrase ‘the problem of the problem of induction’ to refer to the problem of figuring out what 
exactly is the skeptic’s positive argument against the rationality of induction. In the absence of a 
precisely formulated positive argument, it is easy to be dismissive of the skeptic. In the next 
section, I try to formulate a more compelling, probabilistic challenge to our inductive practices, 
which focuses on our inductive evidence for the fundamental laws of physics.  
 
1 According to the philpapers survey conducted by Bourget and Chalmers (2014), 81.6% of philosophers endorse 
‘non-skeptical realism’ about the external world. 
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3. An Inconsistent Triad 
I will start with a certain fanciful thought experiment. Suppose God presents you with two books. 
Both books contain maximally specific descriptions of a way for the world to be. They include, 
for example, two alternative complete descriptions of space-time and its material occupants. God 
assures you that both books describe genuine metaphysically possible worlds, and he reveals to 
you that one of the books describes the actual world. After spending some time reading the two 
books, you realize that they agree on all matters concerning the present and the past. However, one 
of the books describes a world that goes on to behave regularly into the future, and the other book 
describes a world that goes ‘haywire’ at a certain point in the future. Question: what credence 
should you have that the ‘regular’ book describes the actual world?  
There are two competing pressures here. On the one hand, the totality of your evidence doesn’t 
discriminate between the two books. After all, both books entail your evidence (which is only 
about the past and present) with certainty.2 Suppose we let Cr be your prior probability function, 
E be your evidence concerning the past, and CrE be your prior probability function conditioned on 
your evidence. Furthermore, let’s call ‘Regular’ the proposition that the regular book describes the 
actual world and ‘Irregular’ the proposition that the non-regular book describes the actual world. 
In a Bayesian framework, since both Regular and Irregular entail your evidence, we have that 
Cr(Regular | Regular or Irregular) = Cr(Regular | E and (Regular or Irregular)) = CrE(Regular | 
Regular or Irregular). In other words, your evidence about the past is entirely neutral with respect 
to whether Regular or Irregular is true. So, if you are to assign a higher probability to Regular, it 
must be for some wholly a priori, non-evidential reason. Since your evidence doesn’t count in 
favor of either possibility, a natural thought is that we should apply the Principle of Indifference 
and assign a 0.5 credence to both Regular and Irregular.3 According to one formulation of the 
Principle of Indifference, you shouldn’t assign different probabilities to possibilities which are 
‘evidentially symmetric’, where two possibilities are evidentially symmetric just in case you have 
 
2 Some philosophers would disagree that our evidence is only about the past and present. For example, one might 
think that our evidence is just our knowledge and that we know things about the future (e.g. see Williamson (2000)). 
In response, one can modify the case so that the two books agree on the totality of our evidence, whatever it is. So 
long as our evidence leaves open an uncountable infinity of future possibilities, the three premises of the inconsistent 
triad can be easily reformulated. 
3 See van Inwagen (1996) for an explicit defense of the claim that maximally specific possible worlds should be 
assigned the same probability. 
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no more reason to suppose that one is true rather than the other (White, 2010). In this case, since 
we have no evidence that has any bearing on the question, it is natural to think that we have no 
reason to privilege either one of these possibilities.  
The most powerful objection to the Principle of Indifference is the ‘multiple partitions’ problem, 
which claims that one can get contradictory verdicts from the Principle of Indifference by 
assigning equal probabilities to different partitions of the space of possibilities.4 However, there is 
no multiple partitions problem here. There are only two ways for the world to be! So, since your 
evidence is entirely neutral with respect to Regular and Irregular and there is one unique way to 
‘partition’ these two possibilities, there is at least some pressure to assign a 0.5 credence to both 
Regular and Irregular. 
Alternatively, one could violate the Principle of Indifference and ‘skew’ one’s probabilities in 
favor of Regular, perhaps because Regular is more ‘simple’ or ‘natural’.5 Of course, the inductive 
skeptic will be suspicious of these wholly a priori skewings of one’s probabilities in the absence 
of any evidence. Moreover, such skewings seem entirely arbitrary. Exactly how much should we 
skew our probabilities? 60-40? 90-10?  
Perhaps we should be somewhat biased towards simpler possibilities. Still, given that we have no 
relevant evidence for or against Regular or Irregular, we shouldn’t be too biased. Here is one 
natural way to precisify this thought. Say that some credence function Cr satisfies Weak Regularity 
if and only if it obeys the following principle: 
Weak Regularity: For any evidence E, given that w1 and w2 are maximally specific 
metaphysical possibilities that entail E, CrE(w1 | w1 or w2) ≠ 1 ≠ CrE(w2 | w1 or w2). 
Intuitively, a credence function satisfies Weak Regularity just in case it isn’t maximally biased 
towards one possibility over another in the absence of any relevant evidence. 
The first premise of our inconsistent triad merely makes the following claim: 
 
4 For different responses to the multiple partitions problem, see White (2010) and Huemer (2009). 
5 See Sober (2015) for an overview of the uses of simplicity in epistemology, and see Bradley (2020) for a recent 
approach to the problem of induction that favors natural hypotheses. Hedden (2015) argues that we should be biased 
towards possibilities that are more explanatory. 
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1. It is rationally permissible to satisfy Weak Regularity.6 
You don’t need to be a fan of the Principle of Indifference to find this first premise attractive. All 
this premise really says is that it is permissible not to do the exact opposite of what the Principle 
of Indifference recommends (by assigning all of your credence to one of two possibilities in the 
absence of any evidence). 
Let us now turn to a second thought experiment. Imagine the following evidential situation that 
we might find ourselves in. Suppose that the community of theoretical physicists has unanimously 
decided on the true deterministic laws of physics, L, describing our universe. Suppose, for 
example, that billions of years pass without a single counterexample, any measurement can be 
predicted to arbitrary degrees of precision, the laws are breathtakingly elegant and simple, and 
physics departments are forced to close down because there is no work left for theoretical 
physicists to do. Fundamental physics is finally complete! Given this evidential situation, E*, it 
seems that the scientists are rational in having very high credence that the true deterministic laws 
of physics are L. Moreover, suppose that IC is some maximally specific characterization of the 
initial conditions of the universe, and let wICL be the unique world in which IC describes the exact 
initial conditions and the deterministic laws of physics L holds. Given that CrE*(L) should be very 
high, scientists should also assign a similarly high credence to CrE*(wICL | IC). After all, if they 
were convinced of the truth of L on the basis of E*, then given that the initial conditions of the 
universe are exactly described by IC, they should also be convinced that the actual world was wICL 
on the basis of E*. 
The second premise of our inconsistent triad also makes an extremely weak claim about this sort 
of thought experiment: 
 
6 This claim is far weaker than the claim that it is a rational requirement to obey the principle of ‘Regularity’, according 
to which one should always assign a non-zero credence to any possibility that is compatible with one’s evidence. First, 
this claim only makes a claim about what is permissible rather than a claim about what is required. Second, this claim 
avoids the main objection towards Regularity, according to which one must assign a credence of zero to possibilities 
that are compatible with one’s evidence if there are uncountably many such possibilities. This problem is avoided by 
limiting the principle to pairwise comparisons of different possibilities. See Easwaran (2014) for more discussion on 
the principle of Regularity. 
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2. Given E*, one shouldn’t set CrE*(L) = 0. So, neither should one set CrE*(wICL | IC) = 0.7 
All this premise says is that one shouldn’t believe the exact opposite of what all the scientific 
experts believe. If all the scientific experts assign high credence to L given E*, you shouldn’t be 
maximally confident that L is false given E*. Similarly, if all the scientific experts believe in global 
warming, you shouldn’t assign a credence of 0 to global warming. 
The final premise of our inconsistent triad appeals to the Humean thought that there are an 
uncountable infinity of ways in which the world may go haywire tomorrow. For example, suppose 
I am about to drop an apple. Perhaps we may expect it to fall at 9.8 m/s2, but we cannot rule out a 
priori that it falls at some other rate. It seems like, for every real number r ∈ [0, 10], there is a 
world just like this one up to now, except the apple drops at exactly r m/s2 when I let it go. In other 
words: 
3. For any initial segment of some world, there are an uncountable infinity of metaphysically 
possible worlds that exactly match that initial segment and deviate afterwards. 
Surprisingly, these three premises imply a contradiction.8 I will bring out this contradiction by 
arguing that 1 and 3 entail the falsity of 2. In particular, I will argue that, given 1 and 3, it is rational 
to set CrE*(wICL | IC) = 0. 
Before presenting the formal argument, it will be useful to provide an informal gloss. The intuitive 
idea behind the argument is just that the scientist’s evidence E* leaves open an uncountable infinity 
of worlds that start out in conditions IC (by premise 3). Only one of these worlds will be wICL. By 
premise 1, it is rational not to be ‘infinitely’ biased towards wICL: when making a pairwise 
comparison of the plausibility of wICL against one of the other worlds left open by the scientist’s 
evidence, one doesn’t have to be certain that wICL is the actual world. However, if one is only 
 
7 As long as one doesn’t take IC to be evidence against the truth of L, the second claim follows from the first. Here is 
a proof. Assume that CrE*(L | IC) is at least as great as CrE*(L). We know that CrE*(L | IC) = CrE*(wICL | IC), since the 
conjunction of L and IC are equivalent to wICL. So, supposing it were rational to assign CrE*(wICL | IC) = 0, then it 
would be rational to assign CrE*(L | IC) = 0. By our assumption, this would force one to assign CrE*(L) = 0. This, 
however, is impermissible. In fact, in order to run the argument we only need to assume that there exists one maximally 
specific hypothesis about the initial conditions that isn’t evidence against the truth of L. 
8 One might be skeptical that this puzzle essentially involves reasoning about infinitary matters, which notoriously 
leads to all sorts of paradoxes. However, in §§8-9, I will illustrate how my preferred response to the problem of 
induction has advantages over orthodox Humean and non-Humean views even when applied to certain (toy) finitary 
cases. 
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‘finitely’ biased towards wICL, because there are so many alternative possibilities that are left open 
(an uncountable infinity of them), the probability calculus forces one to assign a credence of 0 to 
wICL. 
Here is the more formal argument (readers may skip to the next section to avoid these formal 
details). Using 3, let S = {wi | i ∈ I} be the uncountably infinite set of worlds that satisfy both E* 
and IC, where I is some index set.9 By 1, let Cr be some rational prior credence function such that, 
for any world wi ∈ S distinct from wICL, CrE*(wICL | wICL or wi) ≠ 1 ≠ CrE*(wi | wICL or wi). For 
every i ∈ I, let ri be such that the ratio of CrE*(wICL | wICL or wi) to CrE*(wi | wICL or wi) is equal to 
the ratio of 1 to ri. In other words, let ri satisfy the following equation: 
𝐶𝑟𝐸∗ (𝑤𝐼𝐶𝐿 | 𝑤𝐼𝐶𝐿 or 𝑤𝑖)
𝐶𝑟𝐸∗ (𝑤𝑖 | 𝑤𝐼𝐶𝐿 or 𝑤𝑖)
=  
1
𝑟𝑖
 
For any positive natural number n, let Sn = {wi | ri > 1/n}. Since S is uncountable and equal to the 
union of each of the Sn, there must be some m such that Sm is infinite.
10 
Abusing notation, let us also treat S (and Sm) as the proposition that the actual world is one of the 
worlds in S (or Sm). Then, CrE*(wICL | IC) = CrE*(wICL | S), since S is the same set of worlds as the 
ones that satisfy E* and IC. We also have that CrE*(wICL | Sm) ≥ CrE*(wICL | S), since Sm eliminates 
more worlds distinct from wICL than S does. To simplify things further, let us also let Sm* be some 
arbitrary countable subset of Sm that includes wICL. Again, we have that CrE*(wICL | Sm*) ≥ 
CrE*(wICL | S), since Sm* eliminates more worlds distinct from wICL than Sm does. So, in order to 
show that CrE*(wICL | IC) = 0, it suffices to show that CrE*(wICL | Sm*) = 0.  
Let us label the worlds in Sm* as follows: wICL, w1, w2, w3, w4, … It is a theorem of the probability 
calculus that CrE*(wICL | Sm*) = CrE*(wICL | wICL or w1 or w2 or …) = 1 / (1 + r1 + r2 + …). Since 
each of these ri is at least 1/m, it follows that CrE*(wICL | Sm*) = 0, as desired. 
 
9 What if there are too many such worlds to form a set? It will suffice for the proof for S to be merely uncountable. 
So, if there are too many such worlds to form a set, let S be some arbitrary uncountable set-sized collection of worlds 
that includes wICL and satisfies E* and IC. 
10 This is the only step where we use the assumption that S is uncountable. The proof could work equally well for 
countable S so long as we assume that there is some infinite Sn. For example, if one thinks there are countably many 
‘symmetric’ ways the world could deviate from wICL, and one thinks that one should assign an equal ratio between 
wICL and each of these symmetric deviant worlds, then the proof would work just the same. 
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4. Three Ways Forward 
How should we respond to this contradiction? There are three ways out, each of which is 
revisionary of a different aspect of our theorizing about the world.  
First, consider premise 1. The primary motivation for premise 1 appealed to the way we should 
reason about some space of possibilities. Given that we have no evidence favoring either 
maximally specific possibility, it should at the very least be permissible not to be maximally 
confident in either one! In some ways, denying premise 1 corresponds to the standard way 
philosophers have tried to respond to the problem of induction. Many philosophers have thought 
that we should be biased in favor of hypothesis that are natural, simple, or explanatory over ones 
that are gerrymandered or complex. However, it is easy to feel that it is far too dogmatic to assign 
probability 1 to the regular possibility in the absence of any evidence, especially in the absence of 
some sort of explanation as to why we should expect the world to be regular a priori. Let’s call 
those who respond to the inconsistent triad by denying premise 1 Dogmatists. 
Next, consider premise 2. The primary motivation for premise 2 appealed to a certain first-order 
judgement. If the experimental evidence E* for L was so good that every physicist unanimously 
endorsed L, then at the very least we shouldn’t be certain that L is false! Giving up on premise 2 
corresponds to a kind of skepticism about inductive reasoning, since inductive reasoning is 
supposed to align with how scientists actually reason. In fact, denying premise 2 is analogous to 
claiming that induction is no better than counter-induction. After all, if premise 2 is false, having 
the exact opposite views as the scientific community (with respect to the laws of physics) is 
perfectly rational. Let’s call those who respond to the inconsistent triad by denying premise 2 
Skeptics.11 
Lastly, consider premise 3. Premise 3 is a metaphysical claim which is supported by Hume’s 
conceivability argument. Descartes is an example of a philosopher who might have denied premise 
3. According to Descartes, there is a priori reason to believe in the existence of a perfect God, in 
 
11 One might think that this skeptical argument isn’t too worrying because it still makes induction rationally 
permissible. However, an argument for the irrationality of induction isn’t too far off. If one strengthens premise 1 to 
claim that Weak Regularity is rationally required, then one can weaken premise 2 to claim that it is rationally 
permissible to assign Cr(L | E*) > 0. This modified version of the inconsistent triad would still be an inconsistent triad, 
and the first and third premises would entail that it is irrational to believe in accordance with the community of 
scientists. 
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the form of the ontological argument. Since a perfect God is not a deceiver, there is a priori reason 
to doubt the metaphysical possibility of worlds where we are radically deceived, such as irregular 
worlds where apples start falling up for no apparent reason.  
One might also think that contemporary non-Humeans, who believe in fundamental laws, 
necessitation relations, or causal powers, would deny premise 3.12 However, contemporary non-
Humeans typically don’t argue for the impossibility of Humean worlds, which lack such primitive 
non-Humean posits. Typically, non-Humeans only argue that we have good reason to think that 
the actual world is governed by (say) primitive laws. Since standard non-Humean views don’t 
identify any flaws in Hume’s conceivability argument, they are not able to rebut the main argument 
in favor of premise 3. Why can’t the world simply lack primitive laws or (say) second-order 
necessitation relations between universals? The non-Humean needs to provide some reason to 
think that the source of natural necessity in the world can be found in all possible worlds.13 
Let’s call those who respond to the inconsistent triad by denying premise 3 Rationalists. From the 
Rationalist perspective, we should view this inconsistent triad as having a similar structure to the 
so-called ‘fine-tuning’ argument.14 The fine-tuning argument begins with a certain (alleged) 
empirical observation: the fact that the universe is able to support life depends very delicately on 
certain physical parameters. When this empirical fact is supplemented with certain plausible 
probabilistic principles in epistemology, we are led to surprising metaphysical conclusions, such 
as the existence of God or a multiverse. When faced with this kind of argument, we have two 
choices: we can either reject these plausible probabilistic principles or revise our metaphysics (by 
positing a cosmic designer or the existence of a multiverse). Fans of the fine-tuning argument say 
that we should accept these plausible probabilistic principles, and thereby accept the revisionary 
 
12 For an overview of contemporary non-Humean views, see Hildebrand (2020).  
13 A small minority of non-Humeans, such as Wilson (2013) and Bird (2007), have defended ‘strong’ necessitarian 
views, according to which the actual laws of physics govern every possible world, which would make Humean worlds 
impossible. However, rather than responding to Hume’s conceivability argument, these views typically reject a priori 
modal epistemology altogether. There is therefore a worry that these views cannot help with the problem of induction, 
if the only grounds for believing that every possible world is governed by regular laws presuppose that induction 
works for discovering the laws of the actual world. The view I will end up defending is at least in principle compatible 
with the kind of a priori modal epistemology that is defended by Chalmers (2002). In fact, it will crucially utilize what 
Chalmers calls ‘open inconceivabilities’ (pp. 186-188). 
14 For overviews of the fine-tuning argument, see Manson (2009) and Friederich (2018). 
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metaphysical consequences. The structure of the problem of induction is similar.15 The urgency of 
the problem of induction is motivated by an empirical observation: the universe is an 
extraordinarily regular place, which is governed by precise and exceptionless physical laws.16 
When this empirical observation is supplemented with certain plausible probabilistic principles 
(namely, premises 1 and 2), we are led to a revisionary metaphysical conclusion (namely, the 
denial of premise 3). We can either reject these plausible probabilistic principles, or we can revise 
our metaphysics. Either way, something has to give.  
Should we be Dogmatists, Skeptics, or Rationalists? It seems to me that we should at least try to 
be Rationalists. Skepticism more or less amounts to giving up on the scientific enterprise. Because 
Dogmatism posits extremely strong probabilistic biases that don’t seem to have an adequate 
explanation, Dogmatism more or less amounts to giving up on a satisfactory epistemology of 
induction. However, for those philosophers who are committed Humeans, Dogmatism is perhaps 
the most natural horn to take. Dogmatists pay the cost of having an implausible epistemology in 
order to have an (allegedly) plausible modal metaphysics. When all is said and done, it might turn 
out that this cost is worth paying. Still, it is worth inquiring into whether we need to pay this 
epistemological cost. Perhaps the metaphysical price of rejecting premise 3 isn’t as steep as it may 
initially seem. 
 
15 Of course, the substantive probabilistic principles and associated metaphysical conclusions differ between the two 
arguments. For example, the fine-tuning argument needs to be supplemented with principles of ‘anthropic’ reasoning 
concerning the epistemology of self-locating beliefs (e.g. see White (2000) and Sober (2003, 2009)). The argument I 
have presented does not rely on any such principle. Moreover, if the fine-tuning of the universe is to motivate the 
existence of God, it needs to be supplemented with certain prior probabilities concerning ‘divine psychology’ (e.g. 
see Weisberg (2010, 2012) and Hawthorne and Isaacs (2018)). The argument I have presented does not rely on any 
such principle either. The most important similarity between the two arguments is that they can both be motivated by 
a kind of indifference reasoning. However, our inconsistent triad only needs an extremely weak principle in the vicinity 
of indifference reasoning, namely Weak Regularity. 
16 The way I have made this somewhat vague empirical observation precise is by focusing on one particular aspect of 
physical laws: the fact that they are deterministic. An immediate worry that one might have here concerns quantum 
mechanics: haven’t we discovered that the laws of quantum mechanics are indeterministic? I have two replies to this 
worry. First, two of the three main approaches to interpreting quantum mechanics, namely Bohmian Mechanics and 
Everettian Quantum Mechanics, are fully deterministic, while ‘spontaneous collapse’ approaches are indeterministic. 
See Maudlin (2019) and Norsen (2017) for a survey of these three main proposals. As Wallace (2020) has emphasized, 
a main drawback of spontaneous-collapse theories (as well as Bohmian theories) is that they cannot adequately account 
for the full range of applications of quantum theory, since they are largely limited to the non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics of particles. Second, and more importantly, the inconsistent triad does not assume that the actual laws of 
physics are deterministic. Accepting premises 1 and 3 entail that it is impossible for it to be the case that we should 
have non-zero credence in any hypothesis about the deterministic laws of physics, no matter what possible world we 
inhabit.  
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Here is what the Rationalist needs to do. First, the Rationalist needs to provide a coherent 
metaphysical account that responds to Hume’s conceivability argument and casts doubt on premise 
3. Second, the Rationalist should try to avoid the main drawback of the Dogmatist account by 
showing how induction could be vindicated without biasing or skewing one’s probabilities in 
arbitrary ways. In what follows, I will try to provide the very beginnings of such an account.  
The Rationalist approach to induction I will defend involves two key steps. First, in §§5-7, I will 
present and motivate a metaphysical picture on which premise 3 is false.17 At this stage, my goal 
isn’t to argue that such a metaphysics is true, but merely to argue that it cannot be ruled out a 
priori: such a metaphysics deserves to be a serious and live epistemic possibility. Many other 
philosophers have given arguments for the different parts of the metaphysics that I will describe, 
but my main goal will simply be to lay out the different interacting parts of the metaphysical 
picture. Next, in §§8-9, I argue that the epistemic viability of such a metaphysics may open up a 
non-Dogmatist approach to induction. I do this by considering a very simple toy case, which 
illustrates the advantages of the approach over standard Humean and non-Humean approaches to 
induction.  
 
5. The Inscrutability of Matter 
According to many philosophers, science only gives us a very limited picture of the physical world. 
This view has been held in different guises by Kant, Russell, and Lewis, as well as contemporary 
Structuralists and Russellian Monists.18 On this view, science only reveals the abstract causal 
structure of reality, rather than its intrinsic nature. For example, science only tells us that electric 
charge is whatever it is that plays a certain causal role (e.g. it attracts opposite charges and repels 
 
17 I do not wish to argue that the metaphysics that I will describe is the only way to deny premise 3. I am skeptical that 
non-Humean theories that are based on primitive laws or necessitation relations between universals can reject premise 
3, because there doesn’t seem to be any reason to think that these non-Humean features are present in every possible 
world. However, non-Humean views which locate the source of natural necessity in the nature of physical properties 
themselves have a better shot of rejecting premise 3, since every possible world with a similar past to our own must 
have some physical properties.  
18 Langton (2001, 2004) defends an interpretation of Kant in which we can never have knowledge of things ‘in 
themselves’, and Lewis (2008) endorses a similar conclusion. Contemporary Russellian Monists, such as Strawson 
(2006), follow Russell (1927) in endorsing a similar conclusion. For an overview of Structural Realism, see Ladyman 
(2016). 
13 
 
like charges). Likewise, mass is whatever it is that attracts other massive objects and resists 
acceleration. However, science leaves us completely ignorant about the intrinsic nature of (say) 
mass and charge. 
Consider, for example, the following, allegedly complete, description of a possible world: 
Structuralist World: There is a single entity x which has some property or other, call it F. 
All there is to say about F is that it makes things that have it have some other property, call 
it G, at the next time. All there is to say about G is that it makes things that have it have the 
property of being F at the next time. This cycling goes on forever. 
To many philosophers, it seems like this cannot be a complete description of a possible world. The 
description leaves out the intrinsic nature of F and G, because it only describes the causal relations 
between F and G. Some have thought that in a structuralist world such as this one, the nature of 
any property would circularly depend on the nature of other properties. Since the nature of F is 
wholly exhausted by how it effects the nature of G, it seems like to understand the nature of F we 
would first have to understand the nature of G. But, similarly, since the nature of G is wholly 
exhausted by how it effects the nature of F, it seems like to understand the nature of G we would 
first have to understand the nature of F!19 
To get a better grip on these ‘intrinsic natures’, consider the following analogy. There are two 
ways of describing phenomenal properties, which specify what it’s like to be something. 
Functionally, pain is whatever it is that occupies a certain causal role. For example, it is typically 
caused by tissue damage and typically causes avoidance behavior. However, there is also the 
intrinsic nature of pain – how it feels, or its ‘phenomenal character’. There is what pain does on 
the one hand, and what it is intrinsically like, on the other hand. According to many philosophers, 
the same goes for matter. Physics only describes what physical properties do, but not what they 
are intrinsically like.  
What are these intrinsic natures of fundamental physical properties like? Philosophers who have 
advocated for this view typically are skeptical that we can know what they are like. Continuing 
 
19 This circularity worry has been advanced by Russell (1927), Robinson (1982), Blackburn (1990), Armstrong (1997), 
Heil (2003), Lowe (2006), and Goff (2017). It is primarily directed towards ‘pure powers’ theorists, such as Bird 
(2007), who believe that the nature of a physical property is wholly exhausted by its causal powers. 
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with the analogy of phenomenal properties, many have thought that phenomenal properties that 
are radically different than the ones we have experienced are ineffable to us. For a blind person, it 
is hard to see how the nature of phenomenal colors could be adequately described. Similarly, if we 
were to meet a radically alien intelligent species, we couldn’t begin to describe what their 
phenomenology is like. Our situation isn’t that there is a range of perfectly well-understood options 
for what the alien’s phenomenology could be like, and we are simply ignorant of which is the 
correct option. Rather, the complete truth about the alien’s phenomenology is just not describable 
using the concepts that we have. Similarly, it is natural to think that the intrinsic nature of matter 
is ineffable to us. It is not that we have a range of perfectly well-understood options for what the 
intrinsic nature of matter could be like, and we are simply ignorant of which is the correct option. 
Rather, it seems like the complete truth about the intrinsic nature of matter is just not describable 
using the concepts we have. 
These considerations motivate the following metaphysical thesis, which many philosophers have 
argued is ultimately an a priori truth: 
NATURE: Necessarily, all fundamental physical properties have some intrinsic nature.20 
By appealing to NATURE, we can already see that there is a problem with Hume’s conceivability 
argument. When we are conceiving of irregular worlds, where apples start rising for no apparent 
reason, we are not conceiving of a complete possible world, since we are not conceiving of the 
underlying intrinsic nature of the apple and its surroundings. To continue with the analogy of 
phenomenal properties, when we are watching a movie, the movie does not reveal the 
phenomenology of the people inside the movie. At best, we can only infer their phenomenology 
from what the movie shows. Similarly, when we conceive of an apple rising for no apparent reason, 
 
20 Different philosophers use different terms of art that correspond to the phrase ‘intrinsic nature’, but each of these 
terms has various connotations that I would like to avoid. For example, some philosophers may describe these intrinsic 
natures as quiddities. However, Hildebrand (2016a) draws an important distinction between ‘bare quiddities’ and 
‘qualitative quiddities’. Bare quiddities only differ from other bare quiddities by being primitively distinct. Qualitative 
quiddities differ from other qualitative quiddities by being qualitatively distinct. I am using the phrase ‘intrinsic nature’ 
synonymously with Hildebrand’s notion of a qualitative quiddity. Jacobs’ (2011) notion of a ‘thick quiddity’ is also 
synonymous with my use of ‘intrinsic nature’. Other philosophers may use the term ‘categorical property’ to describe 
these intrinsic natures. However, some philosophers (e.g. see Bird (2007)) stipulate that ‘categorical properties’ cannot 
necessitate a corresponding disposition, but I am using the phrase ‘intrinsic nature’ in such a way so that it is an open 
question whether some intrinsic nature necessitates a corresponding disposition (see §6). 
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it is as if we are watching a mere ‘movie’ of the apple rising inside of our minds, which leaves out 
facts about the intrinsic nature of the apple and its surroundings. 
Say that an ideally conceivable structural possibility is some ideally conceivable maximal 
specification of the spatiotemporal and causal structure of a world.21 Say that an intrinsic 
possibility is some maximal specification of a metaphysically possible world, including its intrinsic 
nature. 
Question: Are all ideally conceivable structural possibilities realized by some intrinsic 
possibility? 
If the answer is ‘no’, then it might well be that the conceivable structural possibilities where things 
go ‘haywire’ may not be genuinely metaphysical possible after all. 
 
6. Powerful Qualities 
We can distinguish two views about the intrinsic nature of physical properties. On one view, these 
intrinsic natures are powerful, and on another view, they are powerless. To say that an intrinsic 
nature is powerful is to say that it grounds a corresponding disposition or causal power. Otherwise, 
it is powerless. 
Again, we can consider an analogy with phenomenal properties. According to some, phenomenal 
properties are powerful. This view has been defended in different ways by Mørch (2014, 2017, 
2019a, 2019b, 2020), Langsam (2011), and Builes (2020).22 While a full defense of the 
Phenomenal Powers view is far beyond the scope of this paper, some initial motivation for the 
view can be found by reflecting on our own conscious experiences. It is natural to think, for 
example, that pain makes subjects who experience it try to avoid it simply in virtue of how bad it 
feels. Pleasure might make subjects who experience it try to pursue it simply in virtue of how good 
it feels. Someone who feels tired or exhausted might be disposed to stay in bed simply in virtue of 
how tired they feel. These connections between these experiences and their effects are certainly 
 
21 For much more on ideal conceivability, see Chalmers (2002). 
22 Goff (2017, 2020) also argues that ‘consciousness+’ properties – properties which have both phenomenal and non-
phenomenal aspects – ground a corresponding disposition. 
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defeasible. Of course, in our own case, human subjects endure pain for all sorts of reasons. 
Someone might endure short-term pain in order to avoid more pain in the future (e.g. going to the 
dentist), or in order to experience a greater pleasure (e.g. masochism), etc.23 However, in the 
absence of any interfering causes like these, it seems like pain has a certain kind of default power 
to dispose subjects to at least try to avoid it. Similarly, throwing a ball at a window might cause 
the window to break, but only in the absence of any interfering causes. Of course, the wind might 
blow the ball away before it hits the window, or the window might be shattered by a rock before 
the ball gets to it, etc.  
It is important to note that the claim that the intrinsic natures of physical properties are powerful 
doesn’t need to be associated with consciousness or phenomenology in any way. Many 
metaphysicians, including Heil (2003, 2012), Martin (2008), Jacobs (2011), and Taylor (2013), 
have argued in favor of a general ‘Powerful Qualities’ view, according to which the intrinsic nature 
of physical properties are both qualitative and dispositional.24   
Other philosophers have argued in favor the so-called Eleatic Principle, which roughly states that 
in order for any entity to exist, it must have causal powers.25 This principle would preclude the 
existence of entities which were entirely causally inert, perhaps because their intrinsic nature is 
entirely powerless. 
Building on these views, here is a speculative metaphysical hypothesis:  
 
23 One common objection to the claim that pain grounds avoidance-dispositions is the phenomenon of pain asymbolia. 
Those who have pain asymbolia may experience pain without the corresponding feeling of unpleasantness, so they 
are not motivated to avoid the pain. For this objection to go through, it would have to be maintained that pain 
experiences for those who have pain asymbolia have the very same phenomenal character as ordinary experiences of 
pain. However, this is doubtful. It is natural to think that the unpleasantness of pain is part of the phenomenal character 
of ordinary experiences of pain. On this view, what the phenomenon of pain asymbolia shows is that ordinary 
phenomenology of pain has two components, a sensory component and an affective component. For those who have 
pain asymbolia, these two components come apart, and they only experience the sensory component without the 
affective component. For much more on this, see Grahek (2007) and Mørch (2019a). 
24 The Powerful Qualities view is usually associated with the claim that qualities are identical to dispositions, whereas 
I have formulated the claim that qualities (or ‘intrinsic natures’) are powerful as the claim that intrinsic natures ground 
a corresponding disposition. For further reason to reject the identity view, see Taylor (2019). However, for our 
purposes, these metaphysical details will not be relevant. So long as the intrinsic nature of a physical property 
necessitates a corresponding disposition (whether this is by grounding or identity), the epistemological pay-offs will 
be similar. 
25 Armstrong (1978) and Ellis (1990, p. 22) endorse the Eleatic principle, and Field (1980) can also be interpreted as 
an Eleatic. See Colyvan (1998) and Cowling (2015) for discussions of the Eleatic Principle.  
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POWER: The possible intrinsic natures of fundamental physical properties are all 
powerful. 
Ultimately, what we should think about POWER will turn on various difficult and controversial 
metaphysical debates. For our purposes, however, we won’t need the claim that POWER is 
particularly plausible. In fact, as we will see below, it is fine if POWER is fairly implausible. All 
we will need at this point is that POWER cannot be ruled out a priori. Given that POWER 
concerns a realm of properties that are entirely ineffable to us, it’s not clear how we could possibly 
rule this out a priori, since we don’t have a positive conception of any of the possible intrinsic 
natures of fundamental physical properties. Because of this, it seems safe to say that POWER 
cannot be ruled out a priori. 
 
7. Regular Powerful Qualities 
We’ve now reached our final section on speculative metaphysics. If POWER is true, what kinds 
of powers can these possible intrinsic natures give rise to? Can they give rise to entirely 
‘gerrymandered’ powers? Consider the power: disposed to play the charge-role before 2020 and 
the mass-role afterwards. Could there be any intrinsic nature that gives rise to this power? 
Again, if we consider the analogy with phenomenal properties, none of the (allegedly) powerful 
phenomenal properties we are acquainted with are anything like this. Pain, for example, disposes 
one towards avoidance behaviors regardless of where or when it happens. Similarly, if you feel 
exhausted, this isn’t going to motivate you to stay in bed on Mondays and jump out of bed on 
Tuesdays. On reflection, it’s hard to see how an intrinsic nature could give rise to such a 
gerrymandered power. Reflecting on our experience motivates the following speculative 
metaphysical hypothesis, which builds on POWER: 
REGULAR: The only ideally conceivable structural possibilities realized by an intrinsic 
possibility are regular. 
If all intrinsic possibilities contain intrinsic natures that are powerful in regular ways, then such 
intrinsic possibilities will only ever realize regular structural possibilities, instead of structural 
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possibilities that go ‘haywire’ in various ways. Again, we will not be needing the claim that 
REGULAR is particularly plausible. As we will see below, we will only need the claim that 
REGULAR cannot be ruled out a priori. 
An obvious clarificatory question to ask of REGULAR is what ‘regular’ means. Although there is 
some intuitive, vague content to which structural possibilities are regular, the phrase is meant to 
be a placeholder that must be filled in by different precise physical principles. An important 
question is exactly how to precisify it. Given that we are speculating about the possible ineffable 
intrinsic natures of things, it’s hard to know exactly how it should be filled. One way it could be 
filled in is by saying that the only structural possibilities realized by an intrinsic possibility are 
ones that are governed by our actual physical laws, such as the Schrödinger equation in quantum 
mechanics. However, this can seem fairly ad hoc. What could explain why every possible intrinsic 
nature must conform to Schrödinger’s equation? 
A more promising route is to look to the long history of both physicists and philosophers who have 
advanced purportedly necessary constraints on the laws of physics of a very general form. In his 
recent book, Darrigol (2014) surveys and assesses many of these necessary principles, ranging 
from the attempts of pre-Newtonian philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz, to present day 
rational reconstructions of Quantum Mechanics. Ultimately, the most plausible ways to precisify 
‘regular’ will come from the kind of rationalistic investigation carried out by these physicists and 
philosophers. Briefly, however, let us go through two simple and non-technical examples of how 
such purportedly necessary principles may be motivated. 
Some philosophers and physicists have thought that certain kinds of conservation laws are 
necessary constraints on the laws of physics.26 Lange (2007, 2012) has also argued that 
conservation laws are distinctive because they should be treated as ‘meta-laws’: laws that constrain 
the ‘first-order’ laws of physics. We might therefore conjecture that one principled way of filling 
in ‘regular’ is as follows: 
 
26 See Darrigol (2014, Ch. 3) 
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CONSERVATION: The only ideally conceivable structural possibilities realized by an 
intrinsic possibility conform to various conservation laws (e.g. conservation of energy, 
conservation of linear and angular momentum, etc.)27 
Rationalist philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz typically argued for the necessity of 
conservation laws on theistic grounds.28 However, in modern times a plausible a priori case can be 
made for CONSERVATION by appealing to certain mathematical results proven by Emmy 
Noether connecting conservation laws to symmetry principles. Using these mathematical results, 
it can be shown that conservation of energy follows from the fact that the laws are invariant across 
time, and conservation of linear and angular momentum follow from the fact that the laws are 
invariant across spatial translations and rotations. We have already seen that the causal powers of 
(say) pain seem to be invariant across time and space. Whether or not pain causes avoidance 
behavior is insensitive to where or when that pain is instantiated. But, we can go further. If the 
causal powers of physical properties are to be fully grounded in their intrinsic natures, then these 
causal powers cannot be sensitive to anything but these intrinsic natures. As a consequence, they 
cannot be sensitive to where or when these intrinsic natures happen to be instantiated. Otherwise, 
the causal powers of physical properties would only be partly grounded in their intrinsic natures 
and partly grounded in where or when they happen to be instantiated. At least given POWER, 
then, it seems like a plausible a priori case can be made in favor of CONSERVATION. 
Another kind of principle that has been pervasive in our physical theories is a principle of 
continuity. Can a physical system transition from one state to another, without traversing states 
that are intermediate between the two? One way to make this principle precise is as follows: 
 
27 The details of exactly how to formulate these different conservation laws will sensitively depend on the physical 
framework that they apply to (for example, these conservation laws look very different in General Relativity than in 
Newtonian Mechanics). Although these physical details are metaphysically important, they won’t matter for the 
general epistemological upshots we will discuss later. The main purpose of this section is merely to illustrate some 
possibilities for how to precisify REGULAR, and so I will consider the simplified case of Newtonian mechanics. 
28 See Garber (1992, Ch. 7) for a discussion of Descartes’ arguments for conservation principles, and Garber (1995) 
for a discussion of Leibniz’s arguments. The modal status of Leibniz’ arguments for conservation laws is controversial. 
In the Theodicy, Leibniz wrote, ‘[The laws of motion] do not derive entirely from the principle of necessity, but from 
the principle of perfection and order; they are an effect of the choice and the wisdom of God’. Leibniz scholars disagree 
about whether Leibniz is best interpreted as thinking that God could have chosen to make a different world than the 
actual world (e.g. see Griffin (2012)). 
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CONTINUITY: The only ideally conceivable structural possibilities realized by an 
intrinsic possibility are ones whose trajectory across phase space is continuous.29 
One might also consider different strengthening of this principle: 
DIFFERENTIABILITY: The only ideally conceivable structural possibilities realized by 
an intrinsic possibility are ones whose trajectory across phase space is differentiable.  
SMOOTHNESS: The only ideally conceivable structural possibilities realized by an 
intrinsic possibility are ones whose trajectory across phase space is smooth (i.e. infinitely 
differentiable).  
These kinds of continuity principles were perhaps most famously defended by Leibniz (NE), who 
wrote that ‘Nothing takes place suddenly, and it is one of my great and best confirmed maxims 
that nature never makes leaps. I call this the Law of Continuity’ (p. 56). One can try to motivate 
CONTINUITY on the grounds that, given POWER, it seems like small changes in the intrinsic 
nature of a physical system should only give rise to small changes in the kind of effects that those 
intrinsic natures give rise to. Otherwise, it would seem that the power of that physical system 
cannot be intelligibly traced back to its intrinsic nature. Suppose, for example, that some physical 
system evolved continuously within the interval of time [t1, t2], but then sharply and 
discontinuously ‘leapt’ to some other state right after t2. Then, the intrinsic nature of the system at 
t2 would have made the system ‘leap’, but the intrinsic nature of the system at any time arbitrarily 
close to t2 did not make the system leap! This would therefore be a case where arbitrarily similar 
intrinsic states of a physical system (the state at t2 compared to the state at any time arbitrarily 
close to t2) give rise to radically different kinds of causal effects (leaps vs non-leaps). A very 
natural hypothesis is that none of the possible intrinsic natures of matter can be like this.30  
 
29 Different physical theories have different phase spaces. The phase space of a physical theory represents all of the 
physically possible states of a system, where each point represents a possible state. Each axis of a multi-dimensional 
phase space corresponds to one of the degrees of freedom of a system (e.g. a particle’s position or momentum).  
30 In contemporary physics, there are some interpretations of quantum mechanics that seem to violate these continuity 
principles (such as objective collapse interpretations like GRW), but there are also popular interpretations of quantum 
mechanics that are perfectly consistent with these kinds of principles (such as Bohmian Mechanics and the Many 
Worlds Interpretation). See Maudlin (2019) and Norsen (2017) for an introduction to these three different 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. 
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Of course, much more should be said about what kinds of physical principles should constrain 
modal space according to REGULAR (e.g. see Darrigol 2014). For our epistemological purposes, 
we will only need the claim that it is possible to understand REGULAR in a precise and principled 
way, and it is not an a priori truth that REGULAR is false. 
 
8. Our Predicament: A Toy Case 
Having finished describing a metaphysics on which premise 3 is false, let us finally turn back to 
our inconsistent triad. Orthodox modal metaphysics, inspired by Hume’s a priori conceivability 
argument, endorses the following: 
PLENITUDE: Every ideally conceivable structural possibility is realized by a genuine 
metaphysical possibility. 
Because of PLENITUDE, orthodox metaphysics implies that premise 3 in our inconsistent triad is 
an a priori truth: 
3. For any initial segment of some world, there are an uncountable infinity of metaphysically 
possible worlds that exactly match that initial segment and deviate afterwards. 
I have argued that PLENITUDE is not an a priori truth. Hume’s conceivability argument fails 
because NATURE is an a priori truth, and we fail to conceive of the intrinsic natures of things 
when we are conceiving of possibilities in which things go ‘haywire’. In contrast to PLENITUDE, 
I have put forward a metaphysical picture in which REGULAR is true, which builds on NATURE 
and POWER. While I have argued that REGULAR cannot be ruled out a priori, I don’t think that 
we are in a position to know that REGULAR is true a priori either. While many philosophers have 
given a priori arguments that support principles like NATURE, POWER, and REGULAR, the 
truth of REGULAR ultimately turns on the possible ineffable intrinsic natures of physical 
properties, which we are largely ignorant of. Since there are principled metaphysical pictures 
which give rise to both PLENITUDE and REGULAR, I believe we should have non-zero credence 
in both pictures. 
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However, if we don’t know REGULAR a priori, how does this help with the problem of induction? 
Do we still need to ‘skew’ our probabilities towards regular possibilities to secure the rationality 
of induction? One of the main motivations for pursuing a Rationalist response to inductive 
skepticism was precisely to avoid the Dogmatist reply to our inconsistent triad, which needed to 
arbitrarily skew our prior probabilities in extremely strong ways.  
I believe that once REGULAR is open to us, there is hope for recovering induction without having 
to skew our probabilities at all. Perhaps we could recover induction by simply being indifferent 
among the possibilities within any given Modal Space. Here is a very toy example that illustrates 
this hope: 
Grid Modal Space: Suppose that every possible world was a 10x10 grid. Each square may 
be black and white, and “times” are represented by the different columns. Suppose the 
actual world is such that the first five columns are white except for the top two squares, 
which are black. What will happen in the future? 
 
      
     ? 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
In this situation, the analog of PLENITUDE is the hypothesis that every combination of white and 
black, all 2100 of them, are genuine metaphysical possibilities. Just to run the example, let us 
suppose that REGULAR corresponds to a regular modal space where Inertia is true: the color 
distribution of every column is identical to the color distribution of the first column.  
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There are three different background metaphysical approaches one might have to Grid Modal 
Space. I will discuss the epistemological consequences of each in turn. 
Suppose, first, that we were convinced of a ‘Humean’ metaphysics, according to which all there 
is to any possible world is the distribution of colors. Then, there would be exactly 2100 worlds in 
our modal space. Natural indifference reasoning gives us that there is a 1/250 chance that the 
regularity will continue to hold, since only 1 of the 250 possible futures correspond to a grid where 
only the top rows are black. This is a chance of ~0.0000000000000009. Of course, insofar as one 
follows the Dogmatist in skewing one’s prior probabilities in favor of induction friendly worlds, 
one will reach more inductively friendly conclusions.  
Next, suppose we were convinced of an underlying modal space analogous to the typical Non-
Humean position. On this view, there are all the worlds that the Humean countenances, but there 
are also additional regular worlds that are governed by fundamental laws. More precisely, for 
every grid that obeys Inertia, there is a corresponding Humean world and a corresponding non-
Humean world that is governed by fundamental laws. On this view, there are exactly 2100 + 210 
worlds (since there are 210 grids that obey Inertia). Applying natural indifference reasoning to this 
modal space gives us that there is a 2/(250 + 1) chance that the regularity will continue, since there 
are two grids (a Humean one and a Non-Humean one) in which the regularity continues as before. 
This is a chance of ~0.000000000000002. Unfortunately, the Non-Humean position barely helps 
at all with the problem of induction! Again, one could always skew one’s prior probabilities in 
favor of induction friendly worlds in response to this problem. The more one is willing to skew 
one’s prior probabilities, the more inductively friendly conclusions one will reach. 
Finally, here is the suggestion that I think we ought to adopt. Suppose one thinks that there are two 
epistemic possibilities for what the true metaphysical modal space consists in. One epistemically 
possible modal space obeys PLENITUDE and the other obeys REGULAR (i.e. Inertia is true). On 
this approach, we first need to assign prior probabilities to PLENITUDE and REGULAR. The 
appropriate probabilities to assign to these metaphysical hypotheses will crucially turn on the 
metaphysical issues we were surveying before. Insofar as the a priori metaphysical arguments in 
favor of principles like NATURE, POWER, and REGULAR are persuasive, we should assign 
higher probability to REGULAR. Insofar as they are unpersuasive, we should assign lower 
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probability to REGULAR. Just to make things difficult, let us suppose that these metaphysical 
arguments aren’t all that strong, and so one finds REGULAR to be very implausible. To make 
things precise, suppose one thought that there was a one in a million chance that REGULAR was 
true. After one assigns probabilities to REGULAR and PLENITUDE, one should proportion one’s 
credence of 0.000001 indifferently among the REGULAR worlds, as well as one’s credence of 
0.999999 indifferently among the PLENITUDE worlds. Conditional on the truth of REGULAR, 
one should be indifferent among the various possibilities in REGULAR, and conditional on the 
truth of PLENITUDE, one should be indifferent among the various possibilities in PLENITUDE. 
By doing this, because there are so many more worlds in PLENITUDE than in REGULAR, any 
particular world in REGULAR will be assigned much more credence than any particular world in 
PLENITUDE. After crunching the numbers, it turns out that observing the first five columns of 
the grid makes the chance that the regularity will continue to be ~0.999999! 
This strategy recovers everything we wanted in inductive inference. First, we don’t want to be 
certain that the world won’t go haywire tomorrow. We should always leave that possibility open. 
Second, we want to be very confident that past regularities will continue into the future. Third, we 
don’t want to have to skew our probabilities arbitrarily in favor of regular worlds. All three of 
these desiderata are perfectly captured by this sort of approach! 
It is important to note that this approach uses a version of the principle of indifference over 
metaphysical possibilities rather than epistemic possibilities. Here are two conflicting constraints 
one might place on rational prior probabilities: 
Epistemic Indifference: For any two maximally specific epistemically possible worlds w1 
and w2, one should assign Cr(w1 | w1 or w2) = 0.5 = Cr(w2 | w1 or w2). 
Metaphysical Indifference: Given that it is epistemically possible that M describes the 
correct space of metaphysically possible worlds, for any two worlds w1 and w2 within M, 
one should assign Cr(w1 | M and (w1 or w2)) = 0.5 = Cr(w2 | M and (w1 or w2)). 
Epistemic Indifference fails because we may have reason to favor w1 over w2 insofar as we think 
that it is more likely that w1 is metaphysically possible. For example, suppose I have some a priori 
reason to assign a credence of 0.9 that w1 is metaphysically possible and a credence of 0.1 that w2 
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is metaphysically possible, even though both worlds are epistemic possibilities for me. Perhaps, 
for example, I have good reason to suspect that there is some subtle logical inconsistency in the 
description of world w2, even though I’m not sure that there is. Clearly, I should not be neutral 
with respect to w1 or w2! This is a straightforward counterexample to Epistemic Indifference. 
Moreover, because the ultimate truth about modal space will turn on the ineffable intrinsic natures 
of things, even ideal reasoners should not be certain about which epistemic possibilities are 
genuine metaphysical possibilities. 
Metaphysical Indifference does not have this flaw. Once one supposes that both possibilities are 
genuine metaphysical possibilities, there doesn’t seem to be any reason to favor one possibility 
over another in the absence of any empirical evidence, and so it is natural to apply the principle of 
indifference. 
According to this Metaphysical Indifference approach to the problem of induction, not only does 
our metaphysics help our epistemology, but epistemology greatly helps our metaphysics! In our 
toy case above, the empirical evidence of regularity constituted an enormous amount of evidence 
that the true metaphysical space of possibilities is given by REGULAR. In fact, the probability of 
REGULAR jumps from one in a million to ~0.999999! If the most plausible explanation for 
REGULAR involves the claim that there are ineffable intrinsic natures of physical properties that 
are powerful in non-gerrymandered ways, then we also have an extraordinary amount of purely 
empirical evidence for this highly abstract, metaphysical claim. One might have thought that 
arcane debates in modal metaphysics are entirely insensitive to ordinary empirical findings. But 
on the Metaphysical Indifference approach, ordinary empirical observations like an apple falling 
at 9.8 m/s2 might have direct bearing on the ultimate nature of modal space. 
 
9. A More Tractable Grue Problem 
I will close by considering a natural objection one might raise to this kind of inductive strategy, 
which is closely related to Goodman’s (1955) infamous problem of ‘gerrymandered’ properties 
such as grue. In the above analysis, I considered two salient (epistemically) possible modal spaces, 
namely PLENITUDE and REGULAR. These are perhaps the two most natural hypotheses about 
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modal space that one might consider. On the first hypothesis, ‘anything goes’ so far as possible 
worlds are concerned. Possible worlds can be as unnatural and gerrymandered as one likes. On the 
second hypothesis, only a privileged class of especially natural and uniform worlds are genuinely 
possible. However, it seems like we can at least entertain many other kinds of ‘gerrymandered’ 
modal spaces, and such gerrymandered modal spaces threaten to block the kind of inductive 
reasoning I defended above. 
For example, let HALF-REGULAR be the hypothesis that all possible worlds must be regular and 
uniform for the first five columns of our black and white grid, however they are allowed to go 
‘haywire’ in any possible way afterwards. Our empirical evidence of the regularity present in the 
first five columns might strongly support REGULAR over PLENITUDE, but it does not support 
REGULAR over HALF-REGULAR. After all, both hypotheses entail that there will be regularity 
in the first five columns. So, if we assign roughly equal prior probabilities to REGULAR and 
HALF-REGULAR, then we should no longer be especially confident that the regular pattern will 
continue in the grid. 
While grue is an example of a particular gerrymandered property (which ‘changes’ between green 
and blue at a particular time), HALF-REGULAR is an example where modal space itself is 
gerrymandered, in which the metaphysical necessity of regularity holds up to some particular time 
and then ‘changes’ when it comes to later times. 
In a sense, these kinds of grue-like problems are pervasive, and they are problems for everyone 
when it comes to the problem of induction. The ordinary grue problem is this: how can we be 
confident that the actual world isn’t ‘gerrymandered’ (e.g. where the laws of physics inexplicably 
‘change’ at some future point), given that there are countless gerrymandered possible worlds? The 
grue problem faced by my approach is this: how can we confident that modal space itself isn’t 
gerrymandered? 
If there really are countless gerrymandered metaphysically possible worlds, then the first problem 
seems to me to be insoluble. There can be no reason for thinking that the actual world is one of the 
few non-gerrymandered possibilities. However, the modalized version of the grue problem seems 
much more tractable. Many philosophers have defended conceptions of modal space where 
PLENITUDE and REGULAR are true, however to my knowledge no philosopher in history has 
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provided a defensible account of modal space on which something like HALF-REGULAR is 
true.31 Gerrymandered modal spaces like HALF-REGULAR seem to involve completely arbitrary 
and inexplicable restrictions on modal space (e.g. why should the necessity of regularity change 
after the first five columns rather than the first seven columns?), and many philosophers have 
defended the claim that metaphysical necessities cannot be completely arbitrary and inexplicable 
in this way, on entirely a priori grounds. While there may be plenty of brute contingencies, there 
cannot be brute necessities.32 If these kinds of a priori arguments are on the right track, then we 
should have a high prior probability against the (epistemic) possibility that modal space is 
gerrymandered in this way.33,34 
 
10. Conclusion 
I have argued that orthodox Humean and non-Humean views cannot recover the kinds of inductive 
inferences that physicists make (§§3-4), and I have put forward an alternative approach to 
induction that avoids the problems with these orthodox views and can plausibly recover what we 
want out of inductive inference in an idealized, toy case (§§5-9). This alternative approach to 
inductive inference seeks to reconcile inductive-reasoning with indifference-reasoning, and it 
transforms the infamous ‘grue’ problem into the more tractable problem of justifying the claim 
that modal space itself cannot be gerrymandered. 
All this being said, the approach I have developed here is far from complete. Nowhere have I 
talked about falling apples or rising suns. There are of course many other problems that would 
 
31 For example, Wilson (2013) and Bird (2007) defend the claim that the actual laws of physics govern all possible 
worlds, which entails REGULAR. It is also natural to interpret certain theistic views as endorsing REGULAR over 
PLENITUDE. Hildebrand (2016b) argues for the related view that the best account of Non-Humean necessary 
connections will be timeless rather than time-limited. 
32 For an overview of the literature on brute necessities, see Van Cleve (2018) and the references therein. 
33 In Beebee’s (2011) influential critique of Non-Humean approaches to the problem of induction, she also appeals to 
time-limited natural necessities like HALF-REGULAR. However, while it may be plausible that HALF-REGULAR 
could be a contingently true natural necessity, it seems far less plausible to suppose that time-limited regularities like 
HALF-REGULAR could be metaphysically necessary.  
34 It should be noted that this kind of approach does assume that there is an objective distinction to be drawn between 
properties like green and grue. Perhaps only one is natural, or only one corresponds to a universal, or only one is 
counterfactually sensitive to observation, or only one is partly grounded in what time it is, etc. However, the problem 
of grue involves two distinct components: (i) drawing an objective distinction between natural and unnatural properties 
and (ii) arguing that natural regularities involve natural properties rather than gruesome ones. The approach developed 
here is only meant to make the second component more tractable.  
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need to be addressed before this kind of approach can be extended to physically realistic 
situations.35 Still, before we tackle the problem of justifying why an ordinary piece of bread will 
continue to be nourishing tomorrow, we should at least have a sketch of how an approach to 
induction could possibly be made to work in very simple, toy cases. My main goal here has been 
to motivate and develop a distinctively metaphysical approach to the problem of induction, which 
is the only hope we have of avoiding the twin horns of Dogmatism and Skepticism. 
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